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THE DODD-FRANK ACT:
A NEW DEAL FOR A NEW AGE?
SAULE T. OMAROVA*
I. INTRODUcTION
Almost two years ago, I wrote an essay for this journal, in
which I attempted to reflect upon the fundamental regulatory
challenges in the financial sector brought to life by the recent
crisis.' In the short period that has passed since that essay was
published, the world of finance and financial regulation has gone
through many important changes. Perhaps the most significant
among them was the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank
Act or the Act), the centerpiece of the post-crisis financial
regulation reform in the United States.2
This short essay is an attempt to present a few early "big-
picture" observations on the broad regulatory philosophy
underlying the Dodd-Frank Act. Echoing the title of my 2009
essay, the question raised here is whether the Dodd-Frank Act, in
fact, provides a blueprint for the twenty-first-century version of
the New Deal - a qualitatively new approach to resolving the
regulatory challenges posed by today's financial markets. 3
Answering this complex question in full is hardly possible at this
stage in the process, when many critical details of the new legal
and regulatory regime are yet to be determined. Nevertheless, it is
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Law.
1. Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations
on the "Big-Picture" Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 157 (2009).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
3. Not surprisingly, commentators frequently invoke references to the original
New Deal in discussing the Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW
FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK Acr AND ITS (UNINTENDED)
CONSEQUENCES (2010).
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worthwhile to reflect upon some of the overarching themes built
into the foundation of the Act, bound to shape the course of the
ongoing reform.
II. ASSESSING DODD-FRANK: Focus ON REGULATORY
PHILOSOPHY
The Dodd-Frank Act is often characterized as a major
overhaul of the U.S. system of financial sector regulation and the
most fundamental set of regulatory reforms in this area since the
New Deal.4  To a great extent, this is true: the regulatory
framework established in principle in the 1930s, in response to the
Great Depression and its perceived causes, has been remarkably
resilient and survived without major alterations for over seven
decades.' The sheer scope of reforms mandated by the Dodd-
Frank Act puts this piece of legislation in a class of its own. This
massive document seeks to address some of the most important
issues raised by the recent financial crisis and to fill many
significant gaps in the pre-crisis regulatory framework.
Despite its great length and undisputed significance, the
Act often falls short of achieving its stated ambitions. Among the
most common criticisms of the new legislation is the fact that it is
simply too unwieldy and contains too many loopholes and too
little substantive details on what exactly needs to be done to
ensure that financial innovation does not jeopardize financial
stability. In fact, most of the actual decisions that should reflect
4. See, e.g., Viral Acharya et al., A critical assessment of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, VoXEU.ORG (Nov. 24, 2010),
("In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act passed earlier this year represents the most
sweeping set of reforms to the US financial sector since the Great Depression."),
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/5692.
5. This is not to say that the regulatory framework remained completely
unchanged over the years, as Congress adopted many laws altering or revising it in a
variety of ways. One of the most significant legislative changes was the adoption of
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12. U.S.C.) (commonly
referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), which repealed the prohibition on
affiliations between commercial and investment banks under the Glass-Steagall Act.
See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12. U.S.C.) (commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act).
6. See, e.g., Cheyenne Hopkins, Despite Claims, Reform Law Provides Plenty of
Exemptions, AM. BANKER, Aug. 10, 2010,
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fundamental public policy choices - a job of the national
legislature - are left to the discretion of administrative agencies in
charge of implementing the new law.7 As regulators feverishly
work on their rule-making mandated by the Act, scholars and
commentators are also hard at work analyzing and criticizing
various provisions of the new statute and identifying specific gaps
8in its coverage.
However, the more interesting question is to what extent
the new law actually lives up to its ambitious claim to bring about a
fundamental reform of Wall Street. Even though the Dodd-Frank
Act did leave too much substance to be filled in by regulators at
the implementation phase, which makes an assessment of its
potential efficacy or practical impact very difficult, what Congress
did say in this piece of legislation provides at least some basis for
setting our overall expectations.
The starting point for such a preliminary assessment is
simple, albeit not entirely uncontestable. The global financial
crisis of 2007-2008 clearly demonstrated that the entire system of
financial sector regulation and supervision, in the United States
and elsewhere,9 was woefully inadequate to effectively curb the
risks posed by new financial products and markets, which had
emerged as a result of technology-driven financial innovation of
the preceding decade.'o The key features of the financial system in
http://www.americanbanker.comlissues/175_152/reform-law-exemptions-1023841-
1.html.
7. According to some estimates, the statute requires regulators to adopt 243 new
rules, conduct 67 one-time studies, and submit 22 periodic reports. See Stacy Kaper,
Now for the Hard Part: The Top Five Challenges of Reg Reform, AM. BANKER, July
22, 2010, http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_139/now-for-the-hard-part-
1022715-1.html.
8. See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 3; REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND THE NEw ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE (Viral V. Acharya
et al. eds., 2010).
9. Thus, the crisis exposed major weaknesses in the regulatory and supervisory
framework in the United Kingdom's financial sector, where the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) was widely criticized for its failure to exercise effective oversight of
various financial institutions' activities. See, e.g., United Kingdom's Fin. Serv.
Authority, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis
(2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner review.pdf. In the
aftermath of the crisis, the new U.K. government announced its plans to restructure
the FSA.
10. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT,
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the twenty-first century are its ever-increasing complexity,
dynamism, and the seamlessly global nature of financial markets
and activities." The unprecedented contagion effect of the latest
crisis provides a powerful illustration of these new dynamics in
global finance." Yet, despite the fundamental changes in how
financial markets and institutions operate in the era of
computerized trading, model-driven financial engineering, and
globe-spanning financial conglomerates, the U.S. regulatory
system continued to rely on the principles and mechanisms
developed many decades ago." The latest financial crisis exposed
this deep discrepancy between the new economic reality and the
old regulatory philosophy.
Does the Dodd-Frank Act, incomplete and lacking in detail
as it is, nevertheless successfully overcome this fundamental
discrepancy? Does it represent a new regulatory philosophy,
which has the potential to effectively address the challenges posed
by globalization and the complexity of modern finance? Does it
offer a change in the paradigm of financial sector regulation,
necessary to prevent future crises of such systemic proportions?
Even at this early point in the implementation process,
when many vital details of the new regulatory regime are yet to be
determined, it seems unlikely. It is already clear that, in certain
fundamental aspects, the Dodd-Frank Act continues to rely on the
old, pre-crisis, regulatory principles and assumptions. Some of
these general trends in the new statute's underlying philosophy are
briefly outlined below.
PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY (2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf.
11. See Omarova, supra note 1 (arguing that the two key features setting the
recent financial crisis apart from all the previous ones are (i) its truly global scope,
and (ii) its causal relationship to financial innovation and complexity of financial
products).
12. See, e.g., Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN'L MGMT 10 (2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1320704.
13. See, e.g., U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO
MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009).
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III. AN OLD DEAL BEHIND THE NEW LAW: FAMILIAR TRENDS IN
DODD-FRANK's REGULATORY PHILOSOPHY
Even a very cursory review of the Dodd-Frank Act reveals
at least three areas in which it fails to deliver conceptually
innovative solutions and remains firmly planted in the old, pre-
crisis way of thinking about financial sector regulation.
A. Regulatory Structure and Institutional Design
Contrary to popular expectations, the Dodd-Frank Act
largely retained the existing regulatory structure in the financial
services sector. Despite the numerous and persistent criticisms of
regulatory fragmentation and increasingly meaningless formal
separation lines among various segments of the financial industry,
Congress opted against a large-scale structural reform.14
In the years before the crisis, industry experts and
academics debated several potential possibilities for such a
structural reform." Thus, one radical proposal envisioned
replacing the existing regulatory agencies with a universal financial
regulator, along the lines of the United Kingdom's FSA or
Germany's BaFin, which would oversee the entire financial
services industry under a coherent legal regime." Another popular
alternative was the creation of a so-called "twin-peaks" system in
which business conduct and prudential regulation would be split
between two separate agencies.17 Finally, short of a major
structural overhaul, many commentators over the years called for
consolidation of the existing regulatory agencies in the banking
sector, as well as combining the Securities and Exchange
14. For a description of the regulatory fragmentation and prior efforts to simplify
the U.S. regulatory framework, see, for example, CARL FELSENFELD, BANKING
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 29-35 (2d ed. 2006).
15. For a discussion of potential alternatives, see U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-32, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY TRENDS CONTINUE TO
CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2007).
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum - Out of Many, One: Why the
United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1
(2005).
17. Michael Taylor, "Twin Peaks:" A Regulatory Structure for the New Century,
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. INNOVATION (1995).
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Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), and creation of a federal regulatory scheme
in the insurance industry.18
None of these proposals have made it into the final reform
legislation. Congress chose to eliminate only one agency, the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which is to be merged into the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).'9 Other than
this merger, the Dodd-Frank Act contains no attempt to
consolidate the existing regulatory structure. It leaves intact the
much criticized product- or license-based system of regulation and
supervision, in which financial institutions are placed in mutually
exclusive regulatory categories. This vertical silo-based structure
creates opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, particularly within a
financial holding company (FHC) structure, which allows the
holding company to take advantage of the differences in the
regulatory treatment of economically equivalent activities
conducted in different subsidiaries. One of the pernicious effects
of regulatory arbitrage is that it potentially allows financial
conglomerates to incur high levels of risk hidden from the
regulators confined to their individual jurisdictional silos. From
that perspective, the problem of structural fragmentation, as it
exists today, is both a symptom and a cause of the underlying
problem of inconsistent and ineffective (and, at times, lacking)
substantive regulation of financial activities.
The Dodd-Frank Act failed to eliminate the structural basis
for regulatory arbitrage by retaining the fundamental principle of
regulatory fragmentation. Instead, it seeks to remedy the key
problems posed by such fragmentation by creating a new
regulatory body, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
18. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 8-13 (2008).
19. This step came as no surprise, in large part because the failure of Washington
Mutual, the largest savings association under the OTS's regulatory oversight,
effectively left OTS in charge of a far smaller segment of the industry. The OTS'
regulation of federal thrifts is transferred to the OCC, its regulation of state thrifts to
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and its regulation of savings and
loan holding companies to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(the Federal Reserve). Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521-23 (2010) (to be codified in 12
U.S.C. § 5412).
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(FSOC), charged with the task of monitoring and identifying
potential system-wide risks across the regulatory division lines.20
From the perspective of institutional reform, the creation of such a
unified systemic risk regulator is arguably the most significant
change under the Dodd-Frank regime.21 However, even that novel
feature of the post-crisis regulatory structure has grown out of an
old, pre-crisis institutional arrangement, the President's Working
Group on Financial Markets (PWG). 22 Much like the new-born
FSOC, the PWG was a multi-agency council, which brought
together the heads of the Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC, under
the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Treasury.23 Although its
official charge did not explicitly include systemic risk management,
the goals behind the creation of PWG were "enhancing the
integrity, efficiency, orderliness, and competitiveness of our
Nation's financial markets and maintaining investor confidence." 24
During market crises, such as the East Asian crisis of 1997 and the
recent financial market meltdown, the PWG effectively performed
the functions of a systemic risk council.H Over the years, the PWG
published several reports on a variety of financial market and
policy issues, but generally kept its deliberations out of the public
eye.
By contrast, the FSOC is envisioned as a more transparent
regulatory body with more strictly formalized functions and
20. Id. § 111 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). The voting members of the
FSOC, headed by the Secretary of the Treasury, include primarily the heads of the
key financial regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Reserve, the SEC, CFTC,
OCC, and so forth.
21. Melanie L. Fein, Dodd-Frank Act: Implications for Bank Holding Companies
and Systemically Important Nonbank Financial Companies, Aug. 2010, at 2, available
at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1657623.
22. The PWG was established by President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order
12631 in 1988, in response to the stock market crash of 1987. See Exec. Order No.
12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988).
23. Id. In addition to its permanent members, the Comptroller of the Currency
and the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) also often
attended the PWG's meeting.
24. Id.
25. In 1997, performing that role earned the PWG a dubious nickname, the
Plunge Protection Team. See Brett D. Fromson, Plunge Protection Team, WASH.
PoST, Feb. 23, 1997, at HOt, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/business/longterm/blackm/plunge.htm.
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broader jurisdictional mandates. Yet, it represents the same
fundamental institutional choice as the old PWG: in a fragmented,
silo-based regulatory system, the best (or, perhaps, the most
convenient, from a political standpoint) source of a unified system-
wide risk management is collective wisdom of the existing silo-
based regulators.27
Time will tell if that choice was the right one. The key
point here is that it was not a radically innovative choice.
Tinkering with the old structure by refurbishing the PWG as the
new systemic risk regulator, enhancing the Federal Reserve's
regulatory powers, creating new research and information-
gathering offices within the existing agencies, and even
establishing the much-heralded Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection inside the Federal Reserve - none of these measures
really amount to a break with the old regulatory philosophy, which
in turn rests on certain outdated assumptions about different
financial institutions' business and risk profiles and the efficacy of
keeping them in separate regulatory silos.
B. Reliance on Statutory Firewalls
Another important, albeit not immediately obvious, trend
in the Dodd-Frank Act's regulatory philosophy is its continuing
reliance on statutory firewalls as the key mechanism safeguarding
the stability of the U.S. banking system.
The U.S. regulatory system often relied on the concept of
statutory firewalls preventing certain categories of financial
26. Of course, potential significance of the new council's powers should not be
underestimated. Thus, the FSOC has the statutory authority to identify systemically
important non-bank financial companies, which would then be subject to regulation
and supervision by the Federal Reserve, and to recommend heightened prudential
standards applicable to all systemically important entities and to any activities that
increase systemic risk. The FSOC also has other powers and responsibilities,
including information-gathering, reporting to Congress, and making
recommendations on supervisory and regulatory matters of systemic importance.
27. In the run up to the Dodd-Frank Act, academics and policy-makers discussed
several alternative forms of a systemic risk regulator, including the delegation of
systemic risk monitoring functions to the Federal Reserve and the creation of an
entirely new systemic risk regulatory agency. For a discussion of these alternatives,
see Roberta S. Karmel, The Controversy over Systemic Risk Regulation, 35 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 823 (2010) (discussing in detail different approaches to the issue of systemic
risk regulation).
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institutions from engaging in certain types of activities or
investments or significantly limiting their ability to do so. Perhaps
the most important example of such a wall is the principle of
separation of banking and commerce, which to this day constitutes
one of the foundational elements of U.S. banking law. Under this
principle, deposit-taking institutions are generally prohibited from
conducting any non-financial, purely commercial activities.2 The
Glass-Steagall Act's infamous prohibition on affiliation between
commercial and investment banks was another such example of an
institutional divide meant to keep depository institutions and
securities firms distinctly apart.29 The quantitative and qualitative
limitations on banks' transactions with affiliates under Sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act also serve as a statutory
firewall intended to protect the depository system's safety and
soundness and to prevent the transfer of the federal subsidy to
securities firms and other non-bank entities.3 0
The Dodd-Frank Act continues this tradition, among other
things, by creating new important statutory firewalls under the
Volcker Rule" and the bank derivatives push-out provisions.32
The Volcker Rule, named after the former Chairman of the
Federal Reserve who championed the idea, amended the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 by prohibiting certain "proprietary
28. For a general discussion of the basic principles and operation of the U.S.
system of bank regulation, see LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES (4th ed. 2011); RICHARD
ScoTr CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY, & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF
BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (5th ed. 2009).
29. See generally GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND
INVESTMENT BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED
1 (1990); Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A
History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971). The prohibition on affiliation among
commercial banks and securities or certain other financial firms has been repealed by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. The Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999, Pub. L, No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12. U.S.C.) (2000) (commonly referred to as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
30. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1. This list of examples of statutory firewalls is far
from exhaustive and includes only some of the more prominent legal mechanisms
explicitly aimed at protecting safety and soundness of the banking system. There are
numerous other examples of such "walls," including various statutory and regulatory
provisions aimed at limiting or eliminating potential conflicts of interest in the
financial services sector.
31. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, sec. 619, § 1841 et seq., 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010) (to be codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1851).
32. Id. § 716 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
2011] 91
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
trading" activities by bank holding companies (BHCs)." This
provision also prohibits BHCs, depository institutions, and their
affiliates from investing in hedge funds and private equity funds,
subject to certain exemptions.? Not surprisingly, the Volcker Rule
was one of the more controversial provisions of the new law.35
The bank derivatives push-out provision of the Dodd-Frank
Act effectively mandates that federally-insured depository
institutions limit their derivatives activities to hedging or similar
risk mitigation directly related to their activities or derivatives
involving assets permissible for banks. In effect, that allows
banks to retain interest rate and currency derivatives, as well as
instruments referencing gold and other precious metals,
government securities and certain other investment-grade debt
securities. Equity-linked and commodity-linked derivatives will
have to be "pushed out" of the bank and conducted by non-bank
affiliates within the holding company structure.
A detailed analysis of the pros and cons of the Volcker Rule or
the derivatives push-out requirements is beyond the scope of this
essay. What is of interest here is the fundamental regulatory
principle underlying these measures. Thus, both of these
provisions aim explicitly at curbing risk-taking by depository
institutions, which enjoy access to the federal subsidy,37 by walling
them off from other market actors that conduct certain high-risk
activities - private investment funds and derivatives dealers. On
33. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 defines a BHC essentially as any
company that "owns or controls" a U.S. bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (2006).
34. Generally, the Dodd-Frank Act permits a banking entity to invest in hedge
funds or private equity funds to the extent such entity's investment does not exceed
3% of the total ownership interests in each fund and the banking entity's aggregate
interests in all such funds do not exceed 3% of its Tier I capital. Id. § 619 (to be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
35. Thus, some commentators supported the rule's prohibitions as necessary
restrictions on financial institutions' risk-taking. See, e.g., Acharya, supra note 4.
Others criticized the rule, as enacted, for leaving too many loopholes for banks to
continue engaging in risky trading activities. See, e.g., Daniel Indiviglio, Dodd-Frank
Bill's Volcker Rule a Win for Big Banks, THE ATLANTIC, June 25, 2010, (arguing that
the statutory exemptions from the Volcker Rule's prohibitions could make banks'
trading activities even riskier), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/dodd-frank-bills-volcker-rule-a-
win-for-big-banks/58747/.
36. Id. § 716 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8305).
37. The federal subsidy, available to banks and certain other deposit-taking
institutions, generally consists of the federal deposit insurance and access to the
Federal Reserve's lender-of-last-resort facilities.
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the surface, these are quite radical reform measures, designed to
separate the vitally important banking sector from the so-called
shadow banking system, the source of many of the causes of the
38
recent crisis. However, these new statutory prohibitions rest on
an old fiction that corporate entities within a single holding
company structure are truly separate economic enterprises, and
that the key sources of financial risk to banks can be effectively
controlled through imposing certain formalistic, institution-based
restrictions on their investments or activities. These assumptions
tend to over-simplify the dynamics of modern financial services
business. They often clash with the realities of a fully integrated
economic enterprise, where risk is produced, transferred,
managed, and magnified in ways transcending formal intra-
company divisions and legal boundaries.
Ironically, statutory walls that are built on wrong or unrealistic
premises may have the unintended effect of encouraging the
dangerous risk-shifting and regulatory arbitrage they purport to
minimize. Over-reliance on these types of provisions may
contribute to an increase in the cumulative systemic risk level. For
example, pushing out equity and commodities derivatives trading
to a BHC's non-bank subsidiaries, which will make conducting
such activities more costly, may also create incentives for the BHC
to invent new regulatory arbitrage techniques to lower such
additional costs. This new round of financial engineering may
result in the emergence of new types of financial instruments and
transactions that defy statutory definitions. That may further
increase the level of unnecessary complexity in financial market
and thus make effective regulation even more difficult to achieve.
In addition, regulatory agencies' power to define certain
critical terms, to interpret the key requirements, or to grant
exemptions from statutory prohibitions may further weaken the
potential efficacy of a statutory firewall.3 9 The lack of substantive
38. The Volcker Rule and the derivatives push-out provisions may appear
particularly radical because they zero in on derivatives and hedge funds - previously
unregulated and opaque financial instruments and institutions widely perceived as
key drivers of market complexity and instability.
39. For an analysis of this phenomenon in the context of other statutory firewalls,
see, for example, Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives
Changed the 'Business of Banking', 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009).
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detail in the Dodd-Frank Act makes this kind of regulatory
dilution of the legislative intent a distinct possibility.
Thus, despite their high profile and aspirations, the Volcker
Rule and the derivatives push-out rules fall short of offering new,
potentially more effective, solutions to the central problem of
regulating complex risk-generating activities of a modern financial
conglomerate. Instead of identifying innovative ways to limit
upfront the overall level of risk in the system, Congress chose to
rely on the familiar technique of creating statutory firewalls
around depository institutions, based on formalistic and inherently
static criteria and an over-simplified concept of risk transfer.41
While it may have been the most readily available conceptual tool,
a bold shift in regulatory philosophy it was not.
C. Public-Private Balance
Another important "legacy" aspect of the Dodd-Frank Act's
regulatory philosophy, both implicit and pervasive, is the
normative concept of the proper balance between public and
private interests - and functions - in the financial sector.
Undoubtedly, the Dodd-Frank Act significantly expanded
regulatory presence and imposed a host of new, or newly
enhanced, regulatory requirements in many areas of financial
institutions' activities. However, many of these new provisions are
based on the same normative view of the role and purpose of
government regulation that underlies much of the financial sector
40. For instance, some commentators note that the Volcker Rule may not
necessarily limit banks' practical ability to invest in hedge funds and private equity
funds, in great part because of definitional loopholes, and that the rule's practical
impact depends significantly on regulators' approach to implementing it. See, e.g.,
Francesca Guerrera & Justin Baer, Wall Street to sidestep "Volcker Rule," FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 10 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3d49fl2e-edO3-1ldf-9912-
00144feab49a.html#axzzl9Thl79NT.
41. The danger of this approach is that, without a firm foundation in the realities
of the modern financial marketplace and a comprehensive substantive regulatory
framework supporting them, such firewalls may be ineffective and even counter-
productive in the long run. Not only do such ill-conceived statutory prohibitions tend
to encourage regulatory arbitrage and potentially elevate the level of systemic risk,
but their very existence may create a false sense of security and thus impede
productive debate on broader regulatory reform. For a case study of the recent
history and regulatory dilemmas raised by the operation of one such statutory
firewall, Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, see Saule T. Omarova, From
Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2011).
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regulation before the Dodd-Frank Act. They operate on an
assumption that the most preferable, and effective, form of
government intervention in financial activities seeks to ensure an
optimal environment for the proper functioning of the free market
and, as much as possible, to avoid substantive interference with
market dynamics.
However, one of the critical lessons of the recent crisis is the
potential danger of unquestioning reliance on this assumption in
an era when individual profit-seeking actions of private firms in
global financial markets potentially pose a direct threat to vital
public policy goals, ranging from economic fairness to economic
survival. To the extent that excessive risk-taking on the part of
individual financial institutions may cause a precipitous market
meltdown, ultimately leading to economic crisis or recession, it
becomes more difficult to sustain a normative claim that the public
should have as little say as possible in such institutions' private
business decisions. Moreover, as financial globalization ties
together previously relatively discrete national and regional
economies, this social, public interest aspect of financial markets
and activities becomes even more important and difficult to
ignore. As the burden of saving the financial sector and the
broader economy from collapse falls heavily on taxpayers around
the globe, it requires serious rethinking of the existing balance
between the government's duty to protect the public from
economic harm and the private actors' right to pursue economic
gain in the market as free from government interference as
possible.
The Dodd-Frank Act does not attempt to redefine this
balance. Most of its provisions generally rest on the familiar
notion of the public-private balance in regulation, which strongly
favors the private side. Thus, even in introducing new regulatory
requirements or strengthening the existing ones, the Act relies
primarily on such tried and true methods as disclosure and data
reporting, mandatory central clearing and exchange trading, or
registration and capital requirements for financial intermediaries.
While all of these measures are important steps in the right
direction, they merely set up (or improve) legal infrastructure for,
and impose certain conditions on, the operation of financial
institutions and markets. In other words, they determine how
much capital individual firms should hold, what type of
information they should provide to whom, what types of
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transactions they can negotiate bilaterally and which instruments
they can buy and sell on organized exchanges. Ultimately,
however, none of these regulatory methods seeks to impose
directly any substantive limitations on the nature and level of risk
embedded in specific financial products and activities.
Regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives exemplifies
this approach. 42  Thus, the most significant aspects of the OTC
derivatives regulation provisions in the Act include (i) mandatory
clearing of derivatives through regulated central clearing
organizations and mandatory trading through either regulated
exchanges or so-called swap execution facilities, in each case,
subject to important exceptions, and (ii) introduction of new
regulatory categories of financial actors, swap dealers and major
swap participants.43 The regulatory oversight of OTC derivatives
markets is split between the SEC and CFTC in a manner that
largely reflects the historical jurisdictional divisions between these
agencies." The Act requires that market participants report their
swap transactions to the regulators and special data repositories
and charges the SEC and CFTC with the task of promulgating
rules on real-time public data reporting of swap transactions.45
Regulatory agencies are also required to develop new business
conduct requirements for swap dealers and major swap
participants, as well as special capital and margin rules for various
41types of swaps.
42. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 701-774., 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-802 (2010) (to be codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
43. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECrION Acr, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21,
2010 53 (2010), available at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-
413b-b870-b7cO25ed2ecflPresentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-be-4e9a-
ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_FinancialReformSummary.pdf The third significant
aspect of the OTC derivatives regulation under the Act is the "push-out" from banks
into bank affiliates of many derivatives activities, discussed above. While the push-
out provisions may, in some sense, be viewed as imposing direct limits on derivatives
activities, they still merely mandate the shift in where such activities are conducted
within an FHC, rather than any substantive change in the nature of such activities.
44. Id. at 52. Among other things, the SEC and CFTC have the authority to
determine which swaps are subject to mandatory central clearing and, therefore,
mandatory trading on an exchange or through a swap execution facility.
45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §§ 711-720, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-58 (2010) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.).
46. Id. § 719 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8307).
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These new requirements, hailed as a comprehensive
framework for regulation of OTC derivatives,47 are designed to
introduce a degree of transparency and efficiency into these
previously unregulated and opaque markets and to encourage
private actors to manage risks better. However, they fail to
address directly the critical policy issues in this area: how much
risk in derivatives markets is too much for the public to bear, and
what should be done to prevent such excessive risk from being
created in the first place. At the most fundamental level, the
statute's primary focus on establishing new market infrastructure
and disclosure requirements reflects the continuing adherence to
the deeply rooted principle of limited and indirect government
regulation. To the extent the new law seeks to restrain potential
risks posed by derivatives, it does so only indirectly, through
demanding ever more disclosure and rationalizing the clearing and
settlement process, at least for sufficiently standardized
instruments.49 The Act does not actively seek to shape the
markets' risk profile and to eliminate or control the ultimate
sources of potential instability in the financial system, in order to
protect the broader public from the failure of the market forces.
In that sense, despite all of its accomplishments, this new
legislation remains part of the old, pre-crisis regulatory order.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even a brief sketch of certain "legacy" aspects of the Dodd-
Frank Act's regulatory philosophy illustrates some of the potential
limitations of the new legislation. Although the Act is bound to
47. See, e.g., CCH, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECrION Acr: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS 248 (2010).
48. For example, Congress could have imposed explicit limits, or even outright
prohibitions, on certain derivative transactions, based on their riskiness from a
systemic perspective. Thus, one such alternative approach would be mandatory pre-
approval of OTC derivative instruments, which would effectively put the regulators
in the position to decide what level of risk is socially acceptable, as a matter of public
policy. Regardless of their desirability or potential effectiveness, such measures
would have signaled a significant normative shift in the regulatory process.
49. To what extent these provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are likely to bolster
the resiliency of derivatives markets is subject to some doubt. Thus, the sheer
amount of new data to be disclosed under the new regime may be overwhelming, and
the practical usefulness of such disclosure may be quite limited. Similarly, the fact
that the more complex, and more risky, bespoke derivatives are not subject to
mandatory exchange trading and central clearing significantly limits the potential
effectiveness of the Act's approach to derivatives regulation.
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produce many important changes in the operation of the U.S.
financial markets, it falls short of offering a new conceptual
framework for meeting today's, and tomorrow's, regulatory
challenges. Many of the Act's solutions to specific problems
continue to rely on the last century's regulatory principles and
assumptions.
Of course, such continuity in regulatory philosophy may be
viewed as a positive sign. There is a lot to be said for incremental
reforms and time-tested solutions, if they are properly tailored to
the changed circumstances.so However, it is essential that any such
solutions are the result of careful and open-minded analysis and
deliberation, which does not limit the range of potential choices to
what is already there. Despite the many months of academic
discussions and congressional bargaining preceding its enactment,
the Dodd-Frank Act does not exhibit signs of such a deep
deliberative process of critical rethinking of the basic principles
guiding financial regulation in the United States. The truly New
Deal of the twenty-first century may not take shape until after the
next big crisis.
50. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four
Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in
Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 39 (2009) (advocating incremental regulatory
reform).
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